A right-hand glove could be put on the left hand if it could be turned round in four-dimensional space.
I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me whether what I have thought has already been thought before me by another.
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something - a form - in common with it.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.
Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred.
Roughly speaking: to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing.
It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. Language disguises thought.
The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enormously complicated.
Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be ...
It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is that we could not say what an "illogical" world would look like.
The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common. (Like the two youths,...
The solution of logical problems must be neat for they set the standard of neatness.
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
There can never be surprises in logic.
The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphys...
Most propositions and questions, that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. ... (They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful.)
Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical.
